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This pilot study aims to find a way to measure ‘presence’ as a proxy for ecological validity in driving simulators. The
underlying assumption is that a person experiencing a strong sense of presence in the virtual environment will
react as if it were real. We measure ‘presence’ through the ‘attention’ given to the driving task. We hypothesize that
the greater the attention given to the primary driving task, the more the subject will experience spatial presence.
‘Attention’ was varied by adding a second task and oncoming traffic; we then analyzed behavioral measures of
driving performance and subjective ‘presence’. The main result is a lack of congruence between subjective and
behavioral measures. Although behavioral differences were observed between the various experimental conditions,
there was no significant difference in subjective measures of presence. One explanation for this result could be that
in all experimental conditions the driving activity did not require high-level cognitive processes, and was instead
based on bottom-up attentional processes. Many of the processes involved in driving seem to be automatic, and
this study argues for the concomitant use of subjective measures (such as questionnaires) and objective measures
to assess presence in driving simulators. Furthermore, the development of a sensitive measure of presence seems
to require more challenging scenarios in terms of controlled attention, cognitive involvement and more specifically,
the emotions induced by the media. Participants are clearly aware that they are not exposed to any physical danger
when using the simulator and the problem of their motivation must be taken into consideration. Another major
problem is to establish the extent to which they are absorbed in the simulated driving task. A significant challenge
for future research is the emotional validity of driving.
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Driving simulation began in the 1960s, when it was used
to train specific target audiences such as novice drivers,
law enforcement officers and truck drivers [1]. Since
then, there have been many advances in terms of
computing, visual display and the rendering of vehicle
dynamics [4]. Simulators were originally developed to
reduce the cost of field studies, provide greater experi-
mental control, and ensure safety in hazardous condi-
tions [2]. By the second half of the twentieth century,
they were being successfully applied to aeronautical, rail
and maritime operations.
Although there are significant differences, driving
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provided the original work is properly creditedLike flying, driving is a dynamic task that involves a set
of rapid control maneuvers and critical feedback in order
to avoid obstacles and prevent crashes [19]. However,
compared to airline pilots, driving involves higher ampli-
tude and higher frequency cues. Motion feedback does
not play a key role in most of the slow maneuvers
performed by civilian pilots. In fact, there is no evidence
that motion-based simulators are more efficient than
fixed-base simulators for training commercial pilots [7].
This highlights the stark contrast between driving simu-
lation and civil aviation flight simulation; compared to
an airline pilot, the driver needs a higher degree of
motion simulation. The higher complexity inherent in
the driving task probably explains why flight simulators
are widely used for pilot training, while driving simula-
tors are not widely used for driver training [31].
Nowadays, driving simulators are usually designed for
two purposes: research and training. The simulator canrticle distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
hich permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
.
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and workload, or can be used as a test bed for highway
design [26]. The use of a modern, advanced, driving
simulator for human factors research has many advan-
tages, including the control of experimental variables,
efficiency, expense, safety, and ease of data collection
[37]. However, the literature highlights some disad-
vantages, including simulator sickness, the accurate
replication of physical sensations, and most import-
antly, validity [9].
Towards ecological validity
Driving simulators vary in their degree of sophistication
and cost but, despite significant progress it appears that
they lack realism [3]. This is a problem because, if they
are to be useful as human factors research tools, they
must be valid [16] and it is essential to know the extent
to which the data that is collected reflect the results that
would be obtained in the real world. This multidimen-
sional problem is called simulation validation [5] and it
has been a concern for at least the past 25 years.
Blaauw (1982) [5] defined two levels of validity. The
first is the physical correspondence between the simula-
tor’s features, layout, and dynamics and those of its
real-world counterpart. Over the past four decades,
simulators have been designed to deliver more and more
perceptual cues to the driver in order to reproduce
as accurately as possible the experience of driving an
automobile. Thus, validity is often assessed in terms of
the extent to which a physical variable (visual, audio,
and motion feedback) corresponds to its operational
equivalent in the real world. The second level is termed
behavioral validity; this concerns the correspondence
between the behavior of the operator in the simulator
and in the real world. Although studies commonly as-
sume that physical validity incorporates behavioral valid-
ity, the two are not consistently related [44]. According
to Blaauw (1982) [5], the best way to test for behavioral
validity is to compare driving in the simulator with driv-
ing a real car. Specifically, if the data from the two sys-
tems are similar then it is possible to claim ‘absolute’
validity. An alternative method is to compare perform-
ance differences between experimental conditions in the
simulator and a real car. In this approach, if the differ-
ences that are found between the two systems are in the
same direction and have a similar magnitude, then it is
possible to claim ‘relative’ validity [27]. Although abso-
lute validity is obviously the aim of researchers, it seems
highly unlikely that there will be an exact correspond-
ence between data from real-world conditions and the
simulation. Furthermore, from a methodological point
of view there is no ‘bad’ or ‘good’ simulator, because
researchers are usually interested in the effect of inde-
pendent variables (the difference between a controlcondition and other treatments), rather than making
numerical measurements.
Godley et al. (2002) [16] argued that relative, but not
absolute validity is necessary. Similarly, Törnros (1998)
[53] observed that simulation validation should include
a description of the research question and how simula-
tors were used to investigate the question. Therefore,
each simulator must be validated for a specific use,
as each experiment has its own requirements that are
related to different aspects of the driving task [13].
Simulation validation has followed developments in
technical components such as computers and various
display technologies. Over the past four decades, simu-
lators have been designed to deliver more and more
perceptual cues to the driver in order to reproduce as
accurately as possible the experience of driving an auto-
mobile. Thus, simulator validity is often assessed in
terms of the extent to which a physical variable corre-
sponds to its operational equivalent in the real world
(its physical validity) [29].
As previously discussed, simulation validity is multidi-
mensional. It can be related not only to behavioral and
physical dimensions [23], but also to the subjective
experience and objective performance. Nevertheless,
despite significant progress in validity, studies continue
to be criticized for a lack of realism [17]. Specifically, the
physical validity of the driving experience appears unable
to overcome criticisms concerning the lack of psycho-
logical validity [16], defined as the extent to which the
risks and rewards of participation in the experiment
correspond to real-world risks and rewards [40]. The
main problem is that experimental studies cannot pro-
vide a motivation that reproduces motivation in the real
world. Generally, it appears that the assessment of the
validity of the virtual environment involves a comparison
with results obtained from studies conducted in real-life
situations. However, this comparison is expensive (due
to the need for instrumentation) and complex (due to
the need to strictly control of all the events occurring in
the real-life situation). This is probably why most ques-
tions about the validity of simulators are unanswered
[42], and why only a few studies have addressed the
question.
The concept of presence
This paper develops a new approach. We propose that
behavioral similarities between the real and the virtual
environment can be explained using the concept of
presence. The question of validity does not mean that
physical validity should be set against psychological
validity. Our approach establishes a methodological tra-
deoff that is based on both behavioral and psychological
considerations, in order to investigate the ecological
validity of simulators.
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reality, where the purpose is to allow one (or more)
people to take part in sensorimotor and cognitive activ-
ity in an artificial world [28]. The interaction between a
person and a virtual world is a transposition of the
perception-cognition-action loop in the real world.
Immersion in a virtual world cannot be the same as in
the real world [22] given that the user has learned how
to act naturally in a real and physical world (for in-
stance, without any delay and/ or sensorimotor bias).
Thus, depending on the sensorimotor parameters that
characterize the simulator, immersion in the virtual en-
vironment is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition
for performance that is representative of an actual situ-
ation [30]. Faced with this problem, in the 1980s a con-
cept emerged from early research into virtual reality,
which assesses the issue of the ‘ecological’ validity of
behavior observed in virtual environments. It is known
as ‘presence’ and a wide range of academic disciplines
have taken an interest in it, resulting in a range of
conceptualizations. For example, Lee (2004, p. 37) de-
fines presence as “a psychological state in which virtual
(para-authentic or artificial) objects are experienced as
actual objects”. This definition is consistent with the
general notion of presence, i.e. a “perceptual illusion of
nonmediation” [32]. The concept also includes ideas that
are at the core of spatial presence, i.e. the experience of
being located in the midst of mediated (virtual) objects.
In fact, it is sometimes expressed in terms of a common
metaphor, i.e. “being there” [32, 51]. The main charac-
teristic of spatial presence is the belief of being located
in a mediated environment.
The concept of presence was used for the first time in
the field of teleoperations, to designate the operator’s
subjective sensation of being in the remote environment
of the robot they were controlling, rather than their own
near physical environment [47, 51, 57]. To have this
feeling of presence, the user must be involved in the
virtual environment and their tasks, to the point where
they are unaware of the mediating technology [33]. Like
Slater (2002), Wirth et al. (2007) [56] regarded the state
of ‘Spatial Presence’ as a binary (on/off ) experience,
during which perceived self-location and in most cases,
perceived actions are connected to a mediated spatial
environment, and mental capacities are bounded by the
mediated environment rather than reality. Some studies
[24, 51] have proposed the concept as a tool for asses-
sing driving or railway simulators, but only in situations
generating a state of stress.
The main challenge in studies of presence [49, 50, 52]
is to arrive at a consensus about its conceptualization,
before its operationalization and assessment [48]. Vari-
ous attempts have been made to describe the concept
and despite differences, most authors consider thefoundations to rest on attention [41, 46]. Among early
attempts to develop a unified approach [56], we decided
to base our work on a model developed in 2007 (Fig. 1).
The model is made up of two levels: the first involves
the construction of an unconscious mental representa-
tion of space (the spatial situational model, SSM), which
allows, at a second level, a conscious percept of subject-
ive presence (spatial presence). The approach is inter-
esting because the model provided the basis for the 24-
item ‘Measurement, Effects, Conditions – Spatial Pres-
ence Questionnaire’ (MEC–SPQ), in which each item
corresponds to a major or sub-theme of the model. We
decided to base our work on this methodological ap-
proach because it is the only model that sets out to ex-
plain the emergence and development of spatial
presence.
The novelty of this model lies in its description of the
subjective processes leading to the emergence of the
feeling of presence. Spatial presence is considered to be
an experience that only occurs during exposure to a
medium, and the model is based on processes of percep-
tion and cognition. Higher forms of experience can be
constructed on these foundations [8]. Therefore, the
MEC model considers spatial presence, attention alloca-
tion and the construction of a spatial situation as key
concepts for the emergence of presence. The medium
affects both short-term orienting responses and more
persistent attention allocation [56]. Attention is affected
by external sources of information, although user char-
acteristics are also relevant factors as individuals may
voluntarily direct their attention towards a medium even
if there are no salient stimuli to trigger the behavior.
In most cases, media-induced (involuntary) and user-
directed (controlled) attention allocation processes are
dependent. While both types of processes may be in-
volved in the development of spatial presence, their
relative contribution can vary. Specifically, the model
assumes that intentional, focused attention processes
are negatively related to the immersiveness of a medi-
ated representation. On the other hand, spatial presence
is induced when attention is directed towards the
medium, and away from the real environment.
Many media products contain cues that enable atten-
tive users to establish cognitive representations of space.
For example, a television broadcast can display white
surfaces separated by black lines, which the viewer sees
as a room with white walls. Attentive media users
process spatial cues and incorporate them into their
mental representation of space. Authors call this a
Spatial Situation Model (SSM). An SSM is a mental
model [25, 43] of the spatial environment that the indi-
vidual constructs based on (1) spatial cues, and (2) per-
sonal spatial memories and cognitions [34]. Media users
develop their SSM by integrating spatial cues into their
Fig. 1 The Measurement-Effects-Condition (MEC) model of spatial presence
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though they are a part of the mediated spatial surround-
ings represented by the SSM. Additional cognitive and/
or perceptual processes must occur in order for a user
to move from an SSM to spatial presence.
The SSM is clearly the result of both automatic and
controlled attentional processes. Therefore, our experi-
ment manipulated the cognitive load created by a simu-
lated driving task, in order to generate different
attentional states and levels of spatial presence. The in-
dependent variables were: 1) a secondary task (the
dual-task paradigm) designed to distract the driver
from the primary task; and 2) oncoming traffic, de-
signed to focus the driver’s attention on the primary
task. Our objective was to assess simulator validity
based on the two-level spatial presence model [45].
First we evaluated the behavioral dimension (driving
performance), based on unconscious cognitive pro-
cesses. Then we qualitatively evaluate the conscious
subjective experience based on MEC–SPQ scores.
Our four hypotheses were:MEC–SPQ scores:H1: Traffic in the virtual world is a positive predictor
of MEC–SPQ scores
H2: A secondary task is a negative predictor of
MEC–SPQ scores
Driving performance:
H3: Traffic in the virtual world is a positive predictor
of driving performance
H4: A secondary task is a negative predictor of driving
performance
Method
In this section, we describe the methodology used to
carry out the study. More specifically, it deals with the
presentation of the exprimental setup, the procedure
and the measures (spatial presence questionnaire and
driving performance).
Experimental setup
Twenty car drivers (14 men and 6 women), with at least
five years’ experience took part in the experiment. Each
participant drove an average of 16,000 km per year.
Their ages ranged from 22 to 45 (mean = 32.8 years;
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staff at the Faculty of Sport Sciences at Marseille Univer-
sity, France. Only healthy participants with normal or
corrected vision, who did not suffer from motion sick-
ness, were selected. All volunteers signed an informed
consent form. They were divided into four experimental
groups designed to test the two independent variables,
namely whether a secondary task was performed (or not),
and the presence of oncoming traffic (or not).
The experiment used the SIM2-IFSTTAR fixed-base driv-
ing simulator equipped with an ARCHISIM object database
[12]. The projected display (at 30 Hz) offered a 150° hori-
zontal and 40° vertical field of view. The cockpit (see Fig. 2)
contained a microcontroller managing a force feedback
steering wheel, 3 pedals (accelerator, brake, clutch), a gear
box, display dials (speedometer, tachometer) and various
switches (windscreen wipers, lights, etc.). Driving perform-
ance was recorded online for offline analysis.
A high-end Windows XP desktop computer powered the
simulator. It was equipped with a 3.0 GHz Intel Core 2 Ex-
treme CPU, and 4.0 GB of 2000 MHz DDR3 RAM. Two
NVidia Geforce 8800 Ultra graphics cards were used for
video output, either in standard or parallel processing
(SLI) mode depending on the display configuration. The
simulator’s hardware provides a full range of sensory cues
and stimuli to the driver who in turn, controls the simula-
tion model that is represented in software. Modular sub-
systems provide simulator functionality. These subsystems
include the visual system, auditory cue generation, data
collection, scenario generation and control.
Procedure
We used a digital model of the Versailles Satory runway
(see Fig. 3), which is a closed 3.7 km loop with long
straight stretches and corners with different radii of
curvature.
The first independent variable was whether there was
bidirectional traffic (or not), which varied the level of at-
tention (see Fig. 4). A bidirectional traffic system divides
drivers into two streams of traffic that flow in opposite
directions.Fig. 2 The driving simulatorThe second was the introduction of a second task
(or not). This required the participant to launch a digital
hourglass by double-clicking the mouse of a laptop posi-
tioned so that the driver had to avert their gaze from the
main scene. This task had to be carried out every mi-
nute. One group performed this task in oncoming traffic,
while the other group carried it out in no-traffic condi-
tions. It is important to note that the secondary task was
not used to measure performance, which is why reaction
times were not recorded. In all experimental conditions,
each participant had to complete 10 laps of the track at
a maximum speed of 110 km/h, while respecting the
Highway Code.
Table 1 shows the four experimental groups, each of
five subjects.
MEC (Measurement, Effects, Conditions) Spatial presence
questionnaire
We administered an adapted version of the MEC Spatial
Presence Questionnaire (MEC–SPQ) after each session
[54]. The questionnaire uses a 5-point Likert scale ranging
from 1 (‘I do not agree at all’) to 5 (‘I fully agree’). The six
dimensions were tested using 4-item scales. At the first
level, Visual Spatial Imagery (VSI) is assessed with ques-
tions such as, “When someone describes a space to me, it’s
usually very easy for me to imagine it clearly”; “I dedicated
my whole attention to the medium” (for Attention Alloca-
tion); and “I was able to imagine the arrangement of the
spaces presented in the medium very well” (for the Spatial
Situational Model). At the second level, cognitive involve-
ment (CogInv) was assessed with items such as “I thought
most about things having to do with the medium”; and “I
didn’t really pay attention to the existence of errors or in-
consistencies in the medium” (for Suspension of Disbelief,
SoD). Finally, spatial presence was measured and analyzed
using the self-location dimension (e.g., “I felt as though I
was physically present in the environment”).
Internal reliability coefficients (alpha) were computed
for each of the six dimensions. Alphas were high, ranging
from 0.94 (Attention Allocation) to 0.76 (Suspension of
Disbelief). Others were: Spatial Situational Model α = 0.91;
Fig. 3 The versailles satory runway
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α = 0.76; and Self-location α = 0.86.
Driving performance
We analyzed four behavioral variables of driving perform-
ance, namely the mean and standard deviation of speed
and lateral position. These indicators were selected as mean
speed and variation in speed are frequently used in studies
of driving behavior [11]. Several studies [38, 39] have found
that visual distractions decrease speed; the driver is as-
sumed to slow down in order to cope with the visual input.
Speed variation can be voluntary, due to the environment
and interactions with other road users, while involuntary
changes are due to loss of control [38]. Mean speed can
also be used as a metric of driver response in situations re-
quiring a change in speed [39].
Changes in lateral position can be caused by tracking er-
rors, which make it difficult to maintain a consistent line.
Increased variation in lateral position is usually associatedFig. 4 Bidirectional trafficwith reduced lateral control [6, 11]. Mean lateral position is
used as a driving strategy metric, reflecting the driver’s de-
sire to follow a safe path [15].
Results
This study validated the spatial presence model, and
more specifically characterized spatial presence using be-
havioral indicators. We analyzed subjective and behav-
ioral measures, based on MEC–SPQ scores and driving
performance respectively.
MEC spatial presence questionnaire
Means were computed for each group for the six dimen-
sions of the MEC–SPQ (see Table 2). Overall, scores
were high. The “Attention Allocation” scale had the
highest mean score (4.2, SD = 0.70), while the “Cognitive
Involvement” scale had the lowest (3.33, SD = 0.95).
We tested our hypotheses using a generalized linear
model, based on a 2 × 2 factorial design and independent
Table 1 Experimental design
Dual task Traffic
Group 1 No Yes
Group 2 Yes Yes
Group 3 No No
Group 4 Yes No
Table 3 MANOVA RESULTS
Dual Task Traffic Dual Task*Traffic
Attention Allocation F = 0.24 F = 0.09 F = 0.01
P = 0.63 P = 0.77 P = 0.92
Spatial Situation Model (SSM) F = 0.58 F = 4.13 F = 0.26
P = 0.48 P = 0.06 P = 0.62
Cognitive Involvement (CogInv) F = 0.36 F = 0.20 F = 1.11
P = 0.56 P = 0.66 P = 0.31
Suspension of Disbelief (SoD) F = 0 F = 0.17 F = 0.17
P = 1 P = 0.69 P = 0.69
Visual Spatial Imagery (VSI) F = 4.48 F = 1.68 F = 0.01
P = 0.05 P = 0.21 P = 0.95
Spatial Presence: Self-Location F = 1.48 F = 0.46 F = 0.02
P = 0.24 P = 0.51 P = 0.89
* statistical significance set at p<0.05
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assessed interactions between the independent variables.
The MANOVA analysis shows that there was no inter-
action between the traffic and dual task conditions (see
Table 3). Contrary to expectations, none of the experimen-
tal conditions had a significant effect on MEC–SPQ scores
(H1 and H2 were rejected).
We computed nonparametric Gamma correlations be-
tween scales for traffic and no-traffic groups. No significant
correlation was found for either group between Attention
Allocation and SSM scores or between the VSI and SSM
scores. Furthermore, neither group had a significant correl-
ation between CogInv and Self-location scores (no-traffic
group: 0.57, p = 0.03 < 5 %; traffic group: 0.68, p = 0.01 <
5 %). However, there was a significant correlation in the
no-traffic group between SoD and Self-location scores
(0.70, p = 0.008 < 1 %) and SSM and Self-location scores
(0.73, p = 0.008 < 1 %). It therefore seems that in the no-
traffic condition, SSM, SoD and CogInv are positive predic-
tors of Self-location. In other words, drivers who do not
have to navigate traffic report a greater subjective sense of
presence. However, the predicted first-level correlations
with Attention Allocation, VSI and SSM are not observed.Driving performance
The analysis of lateral position and speed looked at the
mean and standard deviation for each subject for each
lap.Table 2 Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of MEC spatial prese
Group 1
Attention Allocation M = 4.07
SD = 0.72
Spatial Situation Model (SSM) M = 3.6
SD = 0.28
Cognitive Involvement (CogInv) M = 3.07
SD = 1.19
Suspension of Disbelief (SoD) M = 3.80
SD = 0.65
Visual Spatial Imagery (VSI) M = 3.05
SD = 0.74
Spatial Presence: Self-location M = 3.50
SD = 0.71Lateral position
Lateral position (LP) is the distance between the center of
the car and the center of the lane. As Fig. 5 shows, there is
an interaction between the secondary task and traffic condi-
tions (F = 28.827, p < 1 %). The mean lateral positions of
Groups 1 (1.35 m) and 2 (1.39 m) who were exposed to
traffic are higher than those of Groups 3 (0.92 m) and 4
(0.19 m) who were not exposed to oncoming traffic
(F =164.43, p < 1 %).
In the no-traffic condition, the secondary task had an ef-
fect. Group 3, which did not have a secondary task had a
higher mean lateral position (0.92 m, F = 35.27, p < 1 %)
than Group 4 (0.19 m). This effect was not observed in the
traffic condition.Speed
Figure 6 shows the dual task effect (F = 2.33, p < 1 %).
Over ten laps, Groups 1 and 3 (single task) drove faster
than Groups 2 and 4 (dual task).nce questionnaire scores
Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
M = 4.27 M = 4.20 M = 4.33
SD = 0.28 SD = 0.93 SD = 0.91
M = 3.53 M = 4.27 M = 3.93
SD = 0.73 SD = 0.64 SD = 0.60
M = 3.80 M = 3.33 M = 3.13
SD = 0.80 SD = 1.10 SD = 0.80
M = 3.67 M = 3.80 M = 3.93
SD = 0.75 SD = 0.90 SD = 0.55
M = 3.85 M = 3.55 M = 4.30
SD = 1.29 SD = 0.51 SD = 0.55
M = 4 M = 3.30 M = 3.7
SD = 0.18 SD = 1.31 SD = 0.69
Fig. 5 Mean lateral position depending on traffic and dual task variables
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task and traffic conditions (F = 24.5, p < 1 %). The mean
speed of Groups 3 and 4 (no-traffic) was higher (31 m/
s) than Groups 1 and 2 (traffic) (27.50 m/s, F = 103.45,
p < 1 %). Furthermore, the mean speed of Group 3
(no-traffic, single task) was higher (31.53 m/s) than
Group 4 (no-traffic, dual task) (30.4 m/s, F = 4.94, p < 5 %).
In the traffic condition, the mean speed of Group 1
(single task) was higher (29.74 m/s) than Group 2 (dual
task) (25.25 m/s, F = 85.06, p < 1 %).
Standard deviation of lateral position (SDLP)
Figure 8 shows that for each group the standard devi-
ation of the lateral position did not significantly change
over laps. There was no interaction between groups and
laps (F = 0.60, p = 0.94)Fig. 6 Mean speed as a function of laps and dual task variablesHowever, the standard deviation of the lateral position
of Group 4 (no-traffic, dual task) was higher than other
groups (1.47 m). This compares to 0.83 m and 0.84 m
for Groups 1, 2 and 3 respectively (F = 156.39, p < 1 %)
(H4 is confirmed). There were less significant differ-
ences (based on the Bonferroni post-hoc test) between
Groups 2 and 3 (p = 0.02 < 5 %), and Groups 2 and 1
(p < 5 %) (H3 is validated), but not between Groups 1
and 3 (p = 1).Standard deviation of speed
Figure 9 shows that there was no interaction between
group and lap variables (F = 0.60, p = 0.93). However,
there was a significant interaction between group and
the SD of speed (F = 41.02, p < 1 %). This confirms H4.
Fig. 7 Mean speed as a function of traffic and dual task variables
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lower for Group 2 (1.99 m/s) than Group 1 (14.08 m/s),
Group 3 (11.85 m/s) and Group 4 (12.73 m/s) (F = 41.02,
p < 1 %). There were less significant differences between
Groups 1 and 3, and Groups 1 and 4.
Figure 10 shows that the mean standard deviation
of speed over the ten laps was significantly different
(F = 2.81, p < 1 %).
However, we note that from the fifth lap to the ninth lap
there was no significant difference (F = 0.13, p = 0.97).Linear regressions
Linear regressions were carried out between MEC–SPQ
scores and driving parameters. Only two main results
emerged.Fig. 8 Standard deviation of lateral position as a function of laps and grouA negative linear regression was found between SoD
scores and the standard deviation of the lateral position
in curves (linear effect: β = −0.91, p < 5 %). The higher
the SoD score, the lower the standard deviation of
the lateral position, which suggests improved driving
performance.
A negative linear regression was also found between VSI
scores and the standard deviation of the lateral position
over 10 laps (linear effect: β = −0.98, p < 1 %). Higher VSI
scores correlated with a decrease in the standard deviation
of the lateral position, which also suggests improved
driving performance.
Discussion
The simulation of driving in research into road safety and
the design of assistance systems raises the problem of thep
Fig. 9 Mean standard deviation of speed over the 10 laps for each group
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a unique opportunity to carry out experiments using a
replica of physical space, but to what extent can behavior
be transposed from the virtual to the real world?
The key objective in most studies is that the partici-
pant’s behavior in the virtual world is as similar as pos-
sible to the real world. However, for too long the design
of virtual environments has focused on engineering
considerations [14], and this technocentric approach to
immersion and interaction has become outdated. It is
being replaced by a new, anthropocentric approach
where operators see themselves as fully-fledged users of
the virtual environment. The user perceives and inter-
acts with physical entities and other elements of the
virtual world in ways that do not necessarily require
sensorimotor physical activity. This prevents them fromFig. 10 Mean standard deviation of speed over the ten laps (all subjects)assimilating the virtual reality as a simple copy of the
real world. Immersion is a necessary, but not a sufficient
condition for an accurate representation of the actual
driving situation [37].
Faced with this problem, the concept of ‘presence’
emerged in the 1980s from early work into virtual real-
ity. Presence addresses the issue of the ‘ecological’ valid-
ity of observed behavior. Various attempts have been
made over the past decade to develop a unified approach
to the concept, and we decided to base our work on a
model developed in 2007. This ‘spatial presence’ model
consists of two levels [46]: the first involves the con-
struction of an unconscious mental representation of
space; while the second concerns the conscious experi-
ence of subjective presence. Consequently, presence
depends on the development of both unconscious and
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lated by interaction between the immersive characteris-
tics of the virtual environment and user characteristics.
This is a rare example of a model that can explain the
processes involved in the emergence of presence. More-
over, although it may appear to reduce presence to its
spatial dimension, the final conceptualization is the re-
sult of immersion, interaction and other factors internal
to the user.
Our study is based on the work of [45, 46]. We mea-
sured presence in terms of direct subjective experience
(verbalized by the participant), and indirect behavioral
indicators (driving parameters). The objective was to
assess the validity of the driving simulation through the
concept of presence. The underlying assumption was
that psychological validity is a positive predictor of
behavioral validity. More specifically, we hypothesized
that a person who has a strong sense of presence in the
virtual environment will react as if they were in a real
environment.
Overall, our results showed no significant differences
between the four experimental conditions. In the virtual
world, neither the addition of traffic nor a secondary
task was a positive predictor of MEC–SPQ scores. Al-
though the addition of a second task did not have an ef-
fect on subjective measures of presence it did affect
behavioral measures. [55] argue that low standard devi-
ation (SD) for speed and lateral displacement indicate
good control, and stable and consistent driving. In our
experiment, the SD of speed (in the traffic condition)
and the SD of the lateral displacement (in the no-traffic
condition) were both higher in the dual task than the
single task condition. The no-traffic, dual task group
tended to drive in the middle of the road (they had the
lowest mean lateral position). While this could be inter-
preted as an efficient driving strategy, it is not particu-
larly consistent with the Highway Code. Similarly, the
dual-task, traffic group compensated for the conditions
by slowing down. Unfortunately, an increase in the SD
of speed indicated that their driving became unstable
and that overall driving performance was impaired.
Concerning the MEC–SPQ, the only strong positive
correlation was between SSM and Self-location in the
no-traffic groups. It is also interesting to note that these
were the only groups where CogInv, SSM and SoD
scores were positive predictors of Self-location. This
result suggests that the model was more effective in the
no-traffic groups, and that these groups were more
involved in the subjective experience. However, if the
second level of the model appears to show higher levels
of presence for the no-traffic groups, no significant cor-
relations were observed for the first level, which involved
Attention and VSI linked to the SSM. We argue that this
lack of congruence between the two levels is that, as[46] propose, subjective measures from questionnaires
assess spatial presence as a cognitive feeling, but fail to
reveal the temporal dynamics of attention allocation and
more globally the development of the spatial situation
model. Our results use response time to a simple dual
task, which seems to emphasize that physiological mea-
sures could be more relevant for the assessment of first-
level dimensions.
Finally, the results of the linear regressions between
MEC–SPQ scores and the standard deviation of vehicle pa-
rameters supports the idea that a reduction of variability is
positively correlated with higher scores for items at the sec-
ond level of the MEC model. None of the first-level dimen-
sions (e.g. Attention Allocation or SSM) are correlated to
behavioral variables. This result suggests that the first-level
dimensions of the model fail to capture the dynamics of
driving behavior.
The main outcome of our study was that behavioral mea-
sures revealed significant effects of the manipulated vari-
ables (traffic and task) on driving performance. However,
these effects were not confirmed by subjective reports. One
explanation could be that despite the experimental condi-
tions, driving did not involve high-level, conscious, cogni-
tive processes. Despite the high MEC–SPQ scores, it is
likely that driving was based on a set of procedures or rou-
tines. Our experimental conditions might have been insuf-
ficient to create distinct levels of attention, involvement
and suspension of disbelief, leading to distinct levels of
presence (see Fig. 1). As the MEC model suggests [46], in-
ternal factors (such as emotional arousal) are key elements
in the emergence of a sense of presence based on con-
trolled attentional processes. Thus, high levels of self-
reported presence (positively correlated with behavioral
measures) might be required to develop more challenging
scenarios, in terms of controlled attention, cognitive in-
volvement and more specifically emotions created by the
media. Participants in driving simulations are clearly
aware that they are not exposed to any physical danger,
and according to [23], the main problem to be solved is
how to simulate conditions that engage them.
Conclusion
This study seems to confirm the pertinence of the two
MEC levels. However the SPQ failed to demonstrate the
structural relevance of the model’s first level. Our results
suggest that subjective measurements based on question-
naires fail to report significant behavioral effects. Here, this
was observed in the dual task condition involving the un-
conscious aspects of the attentional dimension. The more
dynamic first-level dimensions suggest that it is more rele-
vant to promote the use of behavioral measures as ‘on line’
measures for their assessment. Subjective measures seem to
be more relevant to evaluate second-level dimensions,
which illustrate the subjective experience of presence. The
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perimental groups adopted different, but more-or-less auto-
mated procedures and strategies. Given the high degree of
automation in cognitive processes related to driving [28],
we argue for the use of both subjective (such as question-
naires) and objective (e.g. physiological) measures to assess
presence in driving simulators. [36] points out that there
has been much debate about the best way to measure pres-
ence. Researchers need to find a reliable, valid, sensitive,
and objective way to measure subjective judgments of psy-
chological states or responses. Until this is found, it remains
unclear exactly what participants are responding to, and
how their responses are affected by the need to continu-
ously assess their experience. More generally, presence
questionnaires are administered after the event, and cannot
reflect ongoing changes in the participant’s state of mind
during the experience [48].
Physiological measures could be an interesting alterna-
tive to overcoming the problems encountered in the trad-
itional questionnaire approach. The objective approach to
measuring presence attempts to measure automatic re-
sponses that are nevertheless meaningfully correlated with
the medium’s properties and/or content [21]. Potential
measures include physiologic processes such as heart rate,
respiration, skin resistance, skin temperature and periph-
eral brain wave activity. This assumes that as the sense of
presence in a virtual environment increases, physiological
responses to the environment will mirror those exhibited
in a real environment [20]. Another advantage of physio-
logical measures is that they are continuous, and can be
used to assess the characteristics of presence over time.
Unfortunately, there are only a few studies that exam-
ine the relationship between presence and physiological
responses [10, 18, 55], but nevertheless some interesting
results have been obtained. [35] successfully used physio-
logical measures (heart rate and skin conductance) as a
surrogate for presence. Similarly, Guger et al. [18] showed
that heart rate reflects the physiological state of the par-
ticipant. Cardiovascular activity and psychophysiological
measures related to the skin (temperature and conduct-
ance) are often associated with emotional experience,
hedonic valence, the orienting response to novelty, and
defensive responses [29]. Similarly, [29] suggested that
both automatic and controlled attention play an important
role in presence, which can be measured by cardiac indi-
cators. Phasic heart rate deceleration has been suggested
as a measure of automatic attention, and respiratory sinus
arrhythmia as a measure of controlled attention. Further
investigation into the subjective rating of presence and
physiological measures are clearly required in order to
understand its dynamics more fully.
Finally, the main limitation of our study is the small
cohort size, which requires a cautious interpretation of
the validity and reliability of our results. Future workshould be based on a larger sample to adequately detect
between-group differences.
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